Competitive Intelligence INSIGHT – Dealing with Insurgency in Iraq, Afghanistan and India.

[Vivek Raghuvanshi]

I have attempted to generate Insight using Competitive Intelligence to enter the mind of Insurgent Leaders in Iraq, Afghanistan and India, to assist law enforcement agencies in their quest for Competitive Intelligence to outflank and outmaneuver Insurgency in Iraq, Afghanistan and India, thereby making "Emerging Markets" in Middle East and Africa and Asia more conducive to "Foreign Investment" and hence "Mitigating Risks of Globalization for International Businesses".

Competitive Intelligence INSIGHT – Dealing with Insurgency in Iraq, Afghanistan and India.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Low Intensity Conflict is always dynamic. Insurgents are aware that static defense has no part in insurgency action and that fixed defense has no place except momentarily when the insurgents lay an ambush. Insurgents action reverses the normal practice of warfare as insurgents seek to avoid battle and tactically evade engagements where they are likely to suffer losses. Hit and Run is the distinct principle of insurgent action. Dispersion is an essential condition of survival and success on the insurgents side as they never present a target and thus can only operate as minute particles of mercury that momentarily coagulate like globules of mercury to overwhelm some weakly guarded law enforcement objective. Insurgents “principle of Concentration” is replaced by “fluidity of force”. Dispersion is also a necessity on the side of counter insurgency as there is no value in a narrow concentration of force against an elusive insurgent. The success in Counter Insurgency in Iraq, Afghanistan and India will lie in being able to extend fine but closely woven net over the widest possible area. The more extensive the controlling net, the likely that the Counter Insurgency drive in Iraq, Afghanistan and India is likely to succeed. Insurgents strategy is always to increasingly over stretch the physical and mental morale of the Special Forces. What insurgents do is that they try to keep the Special Forces in the dark, while the insurgents try to operate in the light of superior knowledge combined with reliable news about Special Forces disposition and moves. Insurgency in Iraq, Afghanistan and India is waged by few insurgents with the support of the many ie sympathy of the local population. Insurgent leaders spend a great deal of time in organization, agitation and propaganda work than they do in fighting Special Forces. For the most important job for an insurgent leader is to win local population over.

An insurgent leader uses EPDC tactics: 1. Explain 2. Persuade 3. Discuss 4. Convince

If the political temperature is correct , then the insurgents however few in number will thrive and proliferate. It is the principle concern of all insurgent leaders in Iraq, Afghanistan and India to get the right political temperature and maintain it. Insurgents in Iraq, Afghanistan and India operating with the greatest speed from inaccessible bases which they change frequently strike at Special Forces in rapid succession at isolated garrisons, convoys trains. Insurgent leaders information is always timely and accurate as they have the support of the local population.

Insurgents leaders in Iraq, Afghanistan and India devote time for OCP: 1. Organization

2. Consolidation 3. Preservation

OCP of regional base areas that are situated in isolated and difficult terrain.

Here Insurgent leaders train volunteers where they are indoctrinated and from there agitators and propagandists are dispersed individually and in groups to surrounding areas to enlist the support of the local population in Iraq, Afghanistan and India. What Insurgent leaders are able to achieve is that around each insurgent base they are able to create a belt of sympathizers who are willing to supply food, recruits and information.

The pattern of the Insurgent leaders process in Iraq, Afghanistan and India is:

1. Conspiratorial 2. Clandestine 3. Methodical 4. Progressive

Next, the Insurgent leaders in Iraq, Afghanistan and India indulges in:

1. Acts of Sabotage 2. Terrorism 3. Elimination of Collaborationists and Reactionary elements.

Insurgent leaders in Iraq, Afghanistan and India then attack vulnerable military and police outposts and weak columns are ambushed. Competitive Intelligence is the decisive factor in dealing with Counter Insurgency in Iraq, Afghanistan and India. Insurgent leaders in Iraq, Afghanistan and India, monitor Security Forces whereabouts, strength, the state of equipment, the supply chain and the morale of Security Forces. Insurgents Intelligence nets are tightly organized and pervasive. In insurgent areas in Iraq, Afghanistan and India, any person without exception is considered an agent including old men, women, boys driving oxcarts and girls tending goats, sheep and cows, besides farm laborers, storekeepers, school teachers, priests etc., The local insurgent cadres put heat on everyone without regard. As a corollary, insurgents deny all information of themselves to Special Forces who are enveloped in an impenetrable fog. The Special Forces stand on an lighted stage and from the darkness around them thousands of unseen eyes intently study Special Forces every move, every gesture.

LIE Tactics work well in Counter Insurgency:

1. Location 2. Isolation 3. Eradication

As far as Battle for Hearts & Minds is concerned, we compete at psy-ops level with the insurgents. AQ Insurgency Doctrine can be summed up as "Sheng Tung, Chi Hsi" ie "Uproar in the East, Strike in the West".

Success in Counter Insurgency will depend upon:

1. Appeal of program 2. Popular Support 3. Quality of Leadership 4. Quality of Troops

5. Military Efficiency 6. Internal Unity 7. Equipment 8. Base Area Terrain 9. Base Area

Communication 10. Sanctuary

cited by: www.corporaterisks.info

Advisor, Corporate Risks

[Vivek Raghuvanshi]

Competitive Intelligence Insight – Dealing with insurgency in Iraq, Afghanistan and India

 

Conflict Studies eJournal Volume 4, No.83: August 19, 2010

 

KELLY M. KADERA, EDITOR

Associate Professor, University of Iowa - Department of Political Science

 

BRIAN H. LAI, EDITOR

Associate Professor, University of Iowa - Department of Political Science

 

Directors - PSN SUBJECT MATTER EJOURNALS

 

DAVID A. LAKE

UC San Diego

 

MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS

University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business, Gould School of Law and the Department of Political Science

 

Advisory Board - Conflict Studies eJournal

 

BENJAMIN O. FORDHAMAssociate Professor, State University of New York (SUNY) - Department of Political Science

 

VIRGINIA PAGE FORTNA

Associate Professor, Columbia University - Department of Political Science

 

SCOTT SIGMUND GARTNER

Professor of International Affairs, Penn State - School of International Affairs

 

SCOTT GATES

International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) - Centre for the Study of Civil War, Professor, Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU)

 

JACK S. LEVY

Professor, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey -  Department of Political Science

KAREN A. RASLER

Professor, Indiana University Bloomington - Department of Political Science

 

KENNETH A. SCHULTZ

Associate Professor, Stanford University - Department of Political Science

 

[Vivek Raghuvanshi]

Competitive Intelligence Insight – Dealing with insurgency in Iraq, Afghanistan and India

 

Political Economy: Government  Expenditures and Related Policies eJournal Volume 3, No.58: June 8, 2010

 

Directors - PUBLIC CHOICE & POLITICAL ECONOMY EJOURNALS

 

MICHAEL C. JENSEN

Harvard Business School, Social Science Electronic Publishing (SSEP), Inc., National Bureau of Economic

Research (NBER), European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

 

[abhishek]

I do agree with the shuttle points highlighted by you pertaining to the modus operandi of the insurgents. However, breaking the nexux of the insurgents with the local people came out as a biggest challenge specially in India. Insurgent will not be successful in their approach and motives without adequate support from the people of that area. In general,the insurgents try to hit the ideology of the people to get the shelter as well as crucial information related to the forces. It is evident from the incident that happened in Midnapur district in the Indian state of West Bengal. So what I believe is the role of human intelligence becomes highly significant in breaking that strong nexux which many times prohibits the locals to disseminate crucial information about the insurgents to the police.